Delegation and the regulation of U.S. financial markets

We analyze the institutional determinants of U.S. financial market regulation with a general model of the policy-making process in which legislators delegate authority to regulate financial risk at both the firm and systemic levels. The model explains changes in U.S. financial regulation leading up to the financial crisis. We test the predictions of the general model with a novel, comprehensive data set of financial regulatory laws enacted specifically between 1950 and 2009. The theoretical and empirical analysis finds that economic and political factors impact Congress’ decision to delegate regulatory authority to executive agencies, which in turn impacts the stringency of financial market regulation, and our estimation results indicate that political factors may have been stronger and resulted in inefficiencies.     

Effects of price sorting display on extreme option choice aversion: The role of ease of comparison in multiple option displays

Due to the popularity of online travel agency (OTA) booking platforms, OTAs display diverse information, including features of products, on their websites. Based on choice architecture literature, this study aimed to examine the effect of product quality and price sorting (vs. non-sorting) on extreme option choice aversion and identify the moderating effect of displays that made it difficult to read information. The results of a series of four experimental studies (total n = 2838 online panel members) demonstrated that the tendency to choose the non-extreme or middle-attributed options was stronger when quality and price were displayed sorted (vs. non-sorted). It was theorized that easy comparison of multiple options leads to decision-making. The positive effect of quality and price sorting on extreme option choice aversion was significantly reduced when customers had difficulty reading the displayed information.     

Natural resource rents and internal conflicts: Can decentralization lift the curse?

We study how natural resource rents affect the risk of internal conflict within countries and how the federal structure of countries influences this relationship. Natural resource abundance may induce excessive rent-seeking and thus increase the risk of internal conflict. Fiscal and political decentralization as an institutional arrangement for rent-sharing and political codetermination of regions within a country may limit the destructive effect of natural resource rents on internal stability. Using cross-country and panel data from more than 90 countries covering the period 1984–2004, we find evidence that natural resource rents indeed increase the risk of internal conflict, but this relationship is significantly mitigated by political decentralization.     

CEO career horizon,corporate governance,and real options: The role of economic short‐termism

Research Summary: Combining studies on real options theory and economic short‐termism, we propose that, depending on CEOs’ career horizons, CEOs have heterogeneous interests in strategic flexibility, and thus, have different incentives to make real options investments. We argue that compared to CEOs with longer career horizons, CEOs with shorter career horizons will be less inclined to make real options investments because they may not fully reap the rewards during their tenure. In addition, we argue that long‐term incentives and institutional ownership will mitigate the relationship between CEOs’ career horizons and real options investments. U.S. public firms as an empirical setting produced consistent evidence for our predictions. Our study is the first to theoretically explain and empirically show that a CEO's self‐seeking behavior will impact real options investments. Managerial Summary: This article helps to explain how a CEO's self seeking‐behavior may shape a firm's real option investment, which could result in different level of strategic flexibility. We argue that CEOs with short career horizons have less time to exercise their firms’ real options, which should lower the investments in the firms’ real options portfolios relative to CEOs with long career horizons. We study a sample of U.S. public firms and find strong evidence that a CEO's expected tenure in the firm is positively related to the real options investments at the firm level. We find that this agency issue can be mitigated by adopting appropriate corporate governance mechanisms such as long‐term incentives and institutional investors.     

To Empower or Not to Empower? Multilevel Effects of Empowering Leadership on Knowledge Hiding

It is widely acknowledged that knowledge hiding persists and has detrimental effects in service organizations. With organizations increasingly becoming team based, understanding the interactions between supervisor and team members especially how team- and individual-level empowering leadership behaviors influence followers’ knowledge hiding is important. Using data on 527 followers from 60 departments in 19 Chinese hotels, the study proposes a multilevel model to examine the manifestation of two types of empowering leadership (individual-focused and differentiated empowering leadership) and the dual-level processes on followers’ knowledge hiding. Results show that differentiated empowering leadership is positively related to followers’ knowledge hiding via group relational conflict, whereas individual-focused empowering leadership is negatively related to followers’ knowledge hiding via their psychological safety. In addition, follower’s psychological safety buffers the positive relationship between group relational conflict and followers’ knowledge hiding. We discuss the implications on both theory and practice of empowering leadership on knowledge hiding.     

Doing more and doing better are two different entities: Different patterns of family control and environmental performance

Family firms bear two types of agency costs, including type I and type II agency problems, in corporate environmental practices: (1) Outside executives at family firms hesitate to engage in environmental strategies, which can lead to drops in profits; (2) Controlling families employ opportunistically environmental management to achieve their interests. We argue that a primary cause for the agency problems lies on ineffective internal corporate governance at family firms, which can cause loss of managerial (or power) balance between outside executives and family executives. Our findings show that family firms with ownership and strategic control (FSC), which family executives and outside executives monitor and constrain each other, can achieve the highest environmental performance. Moreover, external controls, including product market competition and provincial environmental regulations, substitute effective internal control of FSC. The environmental performance premium of FSC is more prevalent when the production market competition is lower. Family firms with ownership, operational, and strategic control (FOSC) can achieve higher environmental performance within a province with more stringent environmental regulations.     

险资股权投资的结构性改革研究*——基于险资投资的倒U型效应分析

保险资金作为重要的机构投资者能否发挥促进公司绩效提升的作用在已有研究和监管政策制定上都存在较大争议。本文以2005-2017年A股上市公司为研究样本，发现险资持股比例对上市公司绩效以及估值影响存在显著的倒U型曲线效应，相应机制研究表明险资持股通过显著影响两类代理成本的渠道发挥治理作用。在适度持股比例以下，险资增持能够降低被投资公司管理费用率和其他应收款占比，并提高资产周转率，从而降低两类代理成本；持股超过一定比例反而造成两类代理成本上升。险资持股比例变化对保险机构调研次数的影响则从公司治理参与角度印证了以上结论。对倒U型曲线效应的深入分析既有助于深化对机构投资者影响公司绩效的多重效应和机制的认识，同时为在金融机构层面落实金融供给侧结构性改革、增强险资服务实体经济能力提供参考。     

Performance effects of innovation in two-sided markets: The paradigmatic case of OTAs

Online Travel Agents (OTAs) play an important intermediary role in the two-sided travel distribution market. A critical factor that enhances a firm's competitive advantage is innovation. Yet, the analysis of innovation in the OTA context is scarce. The main objective of this article is to fill this gap and examine the effect of OTA innovations on firm performance. We analyze the effect of two-sided market specific innovations (same-side and cross-side) on performance and contribute to the literature by expanding the theoretical understanding of innovations. We find that producer-to-consumer innovations have a greater effect on OTA performance than producer-to-producer and consumer-to-consumer innovations. A fundamental managerial implication is that exchange management is an area to be enhanced when innovating in travel market distribution.     

New employee orientation,role-related stressors and conflict at work: Consequences for work attitudes and performance of hospitality employees

Combining role theory with theories on hindrance stressors and intragroup conflict, we develop a model of the attitudinal and behavioral consequences of new employee orientation in hospitality organizations. We test hypotheses about main and mediated effects in this model, using data from a sample of 156 recently hired hospitality interns and applying a longitudinal approach, with data collection shortly after organizational entry and several months later. Results suggest that employee orientation is negatively related to two hindrance stressors: role ambiguity and role conflict. Role ambiguity predicts a range of attitudinal outcomes and the relationship is partially mediated by relationship conflict. In addition, role ambiguity is negatively related to task performance. Role conflict predicts hospitality employees’ job attitudes and this relationship is fully mediated by relationship conflict. We discuss important theoretical and practical implications of these findings for human resource management in hospitality firms.     

Do Rating Agencies Benefit from Providing Higher Ratings? Evidence from the Consequences of Municipal Bond Ratings Recalibration

We ask whether credit rating agencies receive higher fees and gain greater market share when they provide more favorable ratings. To investigate this question, we use the 2010 rating scale recalibration by Moody's and Fitch, which increased ratings absent any underlying change in issuer credit quality. Consistent with prior research, we find that the recalibration allowed the clients of Moody's and Fitch to receive better ratings and lower yields. We add to this evidence by showing that the recalibration also led to larger fees and to increases in the market shares of Moody's and Fitch. These results are consistent with critics’ concerns about the effects of the issuer‐pay model on the credit ratings market.